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Abstract
The main objective of this research is to analyze whether the business cycle has an effect
on investment strategies. In order to ascertain this, we use as methodology, a multifactorial
time series analysis. Specifically, we test whether short-term cycle investment strategies and
long-term cycle investment strategies can be observed. We use data from the Mexican Stock
Exchange, for the period 1993 - 2006. Our results show statistical evidence of short-term
cycle but not for long-term cycle investment opportunities. One of the implications of this
discovery is that these results add to the works that challenge the efficient market hypothesis.
As a conclusion, this work adds some evidence to the writing that link the financial sector with
economic activity. In particular, we found some evidence of a relationship between business
cycle and short-term investment strategies.
JEL Classification: F30, G11, G12, G14.
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Efecto del Ciclo Econo´mico sobre Estrategias de Inversio´n:
Evidencia para Me´xico
Resumen
El objetivo principal de e´sta investigacio´n es analizar si el ciclo econo´mico tiene un efecto
sobre las estrategias de inversio´n. Para conseguir el objetivo usamos como metodolog´ıa un
ana´lisis de series de tiempo multifactorial. En particular, buscamos verificar si las estrategias
de inversio´n de ciclos de corto plazo y las estrategias de inversio´n de ciclos de largo plazo se
observan en la Bolsa Mexicana de Valores. Usamos como muestra datos de la Bolsa Mexicana
de Valores, del periodo de 1993 - 2006. Los resultados muestran evidencia estad´ıstica de
oportunidades para estrategias de inversio´n de ciclos de corto plazo, pero no para estrategias
de inversio´n de ciclos de largo plazo. Una de las implicaciones de estos hallazgos es que estos
resultados se suman a los trabajos que cuestionan la hipo´tesis de mercados eficientes. En
suma, este trabajo aporta ma´s evidencia a la literatura que ha encontrado una relacio´n entre
el sector financiero con la actividad econo´mica, en particular se documenta evidencia de una
relacio´n entre el ciclo econo´mico y estrategias de inversio´n de corto plazo.
Clasificacio´n JEL: F30, G11, G12, G14.
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I. Introduction
The hypothesis that stock market returns from momentum strategies are
positive only during expansionary periods and negative during recession, has
recently been tested and yielded mixed results. For example, Chorida and
Shivakumar (2002) show that profit-to-momentum strategies can be explained
by a set of macroeconomic variables related to the business cycle. Following
on from this, Fuentes et al. (2009) found that momentum portfolios tend to
be riskier during economic expansion, as they are long (short) stocks
with relatively higher (lower) market beta, and are skewed negatively (positive)
during recession.
Antoniou et al. (2007) questions whether business cycle variables can
explain the profitability of momentum-trading in European markets. Their
findings show that momentum is not attributable to the business cycle directly,
but to the asset mispricing that systematically varies with global business
conditions, and this is attributable to the business cycle. Griffin et al. (2003)
examined whether macroeconomic risk could explain momentum profits
internationally, but did not ultimately find any evidence that this was the case.
In Me´xico, Erquizio, (2007) found eight business cycles between 1949 and
2006, the average of which was 27 semesters, with some ascents longer than
descents. This suggests the presence of short-term cycle strategy profits (short
momentum) or long-term cycle strategy profits (long term reverse effect) in
the Mexican stock exchange, an anomaly of financial markets that challenges
the hypothesis of market efficiency. Bearing this in mind, Lo´pez-Herrera et al.
(2012) decided to test the behavior of volatility in the presence of long-memory
effects on returns from the Mexican stock market, and they found significant
evidence of long-memory returns (long-term cycles) from the return series. This
implies that it is possible to predict future prices and extraordinary gains,
contrary to what efficient-market theory points out. Meanwhile, Garc´ıa, Cruz
and Venegas-Mart´ınez (2014) show that for the Mexican stock market, periods
of severe crisis are related to sharp declines in entropy, ie, runs on the stock
market are driven by surprise, making performance temporarily predictable.
The main objective of this research is to analyze, for the Mexican stock
market, whether the business cycles affect capital market investment strategies.
In order to reach this end, we will test if short-term cycle investment strategies
(short momentum) and long-term cycle investment strategies (long term reverse
effect) are observed on the Mexican Stock Exchange, and, if so, evaluate their
magnitude and significance. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The
next section is a literary review, section III presents data and methodology,
section IV presents and discusses the empirical results, and finally section V
presents our concluding remarks.
II. Literature Review
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) provide empirical evidence of the tendency
of people to overreact to unexpected dramatic events affecting stock prices,
which is consistent with a weak form of market inefficiency. They point out
that in revising their beliefs individuals tend to overweight recent information
and underweight prior data. Moreover, security analysts and economics
forecasters suffer from the same overreaction bias. Investors in general
seem to attach disproportionate importance to short-run economic
Revista Mexicana de Economı´a y Finanzas, Vol. 11, No. 2, (2016), pp. 39-49 41
developments. They note that if stock prices systematically overshoot, their
reversal should be predictable. The overreaction hypothesis also predicts that
subsequent price reversal will be more pronounced for stocks that experience
more extreme returns.
Jegadeesh (1990) finds strong twelve-month serial correlations with
individual securities returns, which could challenge the efficient market
hypothesis since it suggests that security returns could be predicted. Because
the evidence is found to be both statistically and economically significant,
alternate asset pricing model specifications should be called for to help explain
this empirical regularity.
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document positive returns in portfolio
strategies that buy securities which have performed well in the past, and sell
those that have performed poorly over three and twelve months. However, part
of the predictable abnormal return dissipates in two years. They attribute the
results to delayed price-reactions to firm-specific information.
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) indicate that contrarian
strategies of investing disproportionally in stocks that are underpriced
and underinvesting in stocks that are overpriced can outperform both market
and extrapolation (momentum) strategies. Contrarian investors bet against
those who extrapolate past performance too far into the future. The prices
of past losers and winners are likely to reflect the failure of investors to
impose mean reversion on their forecasts. They claim that the market learns
only slowly about its mistakes since its expectations of high (low) returns for
winners (losers) are confirmed in the short run but are erroneous in the long
run. They conclude that momentum strategies rely on the markets failure to
recognize a trend in the short term. It seems that market participants appear
to consistently overestimate future growth rates of winners relative to losers,
whereas contrarian strategies are driven by the markets unwarranted belief in
the continuation of a long-term trend and the gradual abandonment of that
belief beyond the first couple of years. The authors speculate as to why both
individual and institutional investors may prefer winners to losers. Individual
investors extrapolate past growth rates even when such growth rates are
unlikely to persist in the future, putting excessive weight on recent past history.
In addition, they equate well-run firms with good investments, regardless of
price. Institutional investors are expected to be freer from judgement bias
than individuals. However, they prize investments that seem prudent, and
picking a winner is easier to justify since winners erroneously appear to be
safer. Because of career concerns money managers may tilt towards winners
even though they are not necessarily less risky and they may earn a low rate of
return. However, many investors have shorter time horizons than those required
for contrarian strategies to pay off. For instance, institutional investors cannot
afford to underperform the index or their peers for too long, otherwise the funds
they manage would be withdrawn. A contrarian strategy may underperform in
the market for too long and risk the money manager’s job security.
Rouwenhorst (1998) obtained similar results with a sample of 12 European
countries during the 1978 - 1995 period. Hong, Lim and Stein
(2000) suggest that heterogeneity among investors who observe different
pieces of private information at different times, explains the momentum effect.
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They assume that information gradually spreads among investors and that they
cannot form rational expectations.
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) evaluate a number of plausi-
ble explanations for momentum strategies. Their sample test results partially
support behavioural explanations, which implies that the momentum effect is
caused by delayed overreaction to information. Behavioural hypotheses also
predict that the profit momentum will eventually reverse. Indeed, Jegadeesh
and Titman (2001) document a reversal of returns in the second through fifth
years. Nevertheless, they conclude that positive momentum returns are only
sometimes associated with post holding-period reversals, thus the behavioural
models provide just a partial explanation of the anomaly in momentum.
Cui, Titman and Wei (2003) find that momentum strategies are profitable
in Asian stock markets with the exception of Japan. They
report a relationship between the legal system in the country and the
momentum effect. Consistent with behavioural models, they also find return
reversals ten months after portfolio formation. Business group firms (keiretsu in
Japan and chaebol in Korean) show a stronger momentum effect. The present
research paper analyzes Mexican securities of which some at least are associated
with business groups. The business groups which exist in Mexico, although
important, are of a different nature to those in Japan and Korea.
Cui, Titman and Wei (2010) examine the cultural differences that
influence the returns of momentum strategies in a number of markets including
Mexico. Individualism, which is related to overconfidence and self-attribution
bias, is positively associated with momentum profits. Individualismmeasures
the degree to which people focus on their own internal attributes and abilities.
In individualist cultures people tend to view themselves as autonomous and
independent. They aspire to be distinct from and better than others; therefore
they tend to overestimate their own abilities. Some investors may overweigh
their own information because they are over-optimistic. In individualist
cultures, people tend to believe that their abilities are above average. The
related self-attribution bias consists of people taking credit for success and
denying responsibility for failure. Overconfidence and self-attribution bias can
generate momentum and long-term return reversals. The authors find a positive
relation between individualism and momentum profits. They also find
that the magnitude of the reversals tends to be higher in countries with high
individualism.
III. Data and Methodology
This paper goes one step further than previous research, avoiding at the same
time the use of excessively-mined U.S. data. The sample consists of 122
securities traded on the Mexican Stock Exchange, for an average of 16 years
between 1993 and 2009. All the stocks with available returns for at least five
months in the year preceding the portfolio formation date are included in the
sample. In Table 1 we show some data of the Mexican Stock Exchange. The
sample includes delisted firms as well as new listings during the period to avoid
survivorship bias. As a comparison, the Mexican sample in Cui, Titman and
Wei (2010) includes between 37 to 47 firms.
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Table 1. Activity Level of the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV)
IPC (I´ndice de Precios y Cotizaciones) is a daily weighted-average index of prices and quotes
from the Mexican Stock Exchange.
Source: Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, S.A.B. de C.V. (2009)
Annual returns (Rit) are obtained from Economatica. First, securities are
ranked according to their annual returns. Three equally-weighted annual
return portfolios are formed: MO1t,MO2t andMO3t every year. Cui, Titman
and Wei (2003, 2010) also form three portfolios because of the small samples
available in emerging markets. Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) also analyzed three
portfolios. MO1t is the portfolio of the securities in the top third of annual
returns in year t − 1. MO3t is the portfolio of the securities in the bottom
third of annual returns in year t − 1. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994)
also assume annual periods, which produce returns close to those that investors
actually gain because of market microstructure issues and transaction costs. In
addition, Jegadeesh (1990) argues that infrequent trading of securities induces
negative first-order serial correlation in returns, which could overstate the
profits from the trading strategies. However, the extent of bias due to this
source and to measurement error is likely to be small when annual returns are
used.
Similarly, average annual returns over the previous five years are
also calculated. Every year three additional portfolios are formed based on five
years of average annual returns: MO1 5t, MO2 5t and MO3 5t. MO1 5t is
the portfolio of securities in the top third for an average of five years when
annual returns are computed at t− 1. MO3 5t is the portfolio of securities in
the bottom third for an average of five years when annual returns are computed
at t − 1. This approach is inspired by DeBondt and Thaler (1985), who find
an inverse effect with a lag of five years, meaning that winners tend to become
losers over this time period. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) also use post-holding
periods of 5 years.
In order to facilitate our study we constructed factors that
represent short-term cycle investment strategies and long-term cycle
investment strategies (long term reverse effect). MOM1t is the annual return of
a self-financing strategy that takes a long position inMO1t and a short position
in MO3t. Similarly,MOM 5t is the annual return of a self-financing strategy
that takes a long position in MO1 5t and a short position in MO3 5t. In
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Table 2 we present the average annual portfolio returns (MO1t,MO2t,MO3t)
as well as the average annual 5-year returns (MO1 5t,MO2 5t,MO3 5t) for
the periods 1998-2009, 1998-2001, 2002-2005 and 2006-2009. On average, over
the post-formation period the losers have an annual return of 28.51 percent
and the winners have an annual return of 14.92 percent, for a difference of
13.59 percent. This large difference pre-empts the presence of the
momentum effect in the context of the Mexican Stock Exchange, since past
winners do not outperform past losers. However, the annual 5-year
return differences are considerably shorter. The short-term cycle investment
strategies factor, MOM1t, is negative in contrast with Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993) and Rouwenhorst (1998), who find it positive. A close examination of
Table 3 shows that average short-term cycle investment strategies are strongly
influenced by the highly negative returns in the sub-period 2007-2009, which
encompasses the beginning of the global financial crisis. Therefore our analysis
focuses on the period 1993-2006. The return of the MOM1t portfolio from
1993 to 2006 is 2.75 percent and statistically significant. In addition, most of
the individual years in that period show positive, though small, returns, which
is consistent with previous published research.
Table 2. Average and Standard Deviation of Annual Returns
of Portfolios and independent variables (factors).
January 1998 to December 2009.
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***Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
MO1t is the portfolio of securities in the top third of annual returns in year t− 1. MO2t
is the portfolio of securities in the middle third of annual returns in year t − 1. MO3t is
the portfolio of securities in the bottom third of annual returns in year t − 1. MO1 5t is
the portfolio of securities in the top third five-year average of annual returns computed at
t− 1. MO2 5t is the portfolio of securities in the middle third five-year average of annual
returns computed at t−1. MO3 5t is the portfolio of securities in the bottom third five-year
average of annual returns computed at t−1. MOM1t is the annual return of a self-financing
strategy that takes a long position in MO1t and a short position in MO3t. MOM5t is
the annual return of a self-financing strategy that takes a long position in MO1 5t and a
short position in MO3 5t . RMt is the annual return of the daily weighted-average index
of prices and quotes from the Mexican Stock Exchange.
Table 3. Average and standard deviation of annual returns of
Independent Variable (Factor) MOM1t.
January 1993 to December 2009.
***Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
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MOM1t is the annual return of a self-financing strategy that takes a long position inMO1t
and a short position inMO3t. MO1t is the portfolio of securities in the top third of annual
returns in year t − 1. MO3t is the portfolio of securities in the bottom third for annual
returns in year t − 1.
IV. Empirical Results
To continue the analysis, we used the time series of a multifactor model (1) to
explore market inefficiencies in annual excess returns (Rpt − Rft) of portfolios
of securities traded on the Mexican Stock Exchange. Rouwenhorst (1998) also
uses a multifactor model including an international version of the size factor.
In addition to the excess market returns over the risk-free rate (RMt − Rft),
MOM1t and MOM5t are included to represent short-term cycle investment
strategies and or long-term cycle investment strategies. Rpt is the annual return
on portfolio p in year t. RMt and Rft are respectively the annual returns of the
IPC2 of the BMV, and 10-year US t-bills, which are available for trade on
both local and foreign markets. The portfolios under scrutiny consist of the
top (p = 1), middle (p = 2) and bottom (p = 3) thirds of Mexican securities,
ranked by returns from the previous year. The returns are all measured in U.S.
dollars. Our results are not altered if we measure returns in local currency.
The construction of short-term cycle investment strategies or long-term
cycle investment strategy factors is one of the contributions of this research. Our
portfolio formation strategies require one and five years of past data respectively.
Therefore, including the MOM1t factor reduces the sample to the period 1994
to 2006, while including the MOM5t factor reduces the sample to the period
1998 and 2006. We examine the subsequent performance of the portfolios in
the year following portfolio formation using returns data from Economatica. In
Table 4 the correlation between the three independent variables RMt, MOM1t
and MOM5t is very low.
Table 4. Correlation Matrix between independent variables (factors).
January 1998 to December 2009.
IPC (I´ndice de Precios y Cotizaciones) is a daily weighted-average index of prices and quotes
from the Mexican Stock Exchange.
MOM1t is the annual return of a self-financing strategy that takes a long position inMO1t
and a short position inMO3t. MO1t is the portfolio of securities in the top third of annual
returns in year t − 1. MO3t is the portfolio of securities in the bottom third of annual
returns in year t − 1. MOM5t is the annual return of a self-financing strategy that takes
a long position in MO1 5t and a short position in MO3 5t. MO1 5t is the portfolio of
securities in the top third five-year average of annual returns computed at t − 1. MO3 5t
Revista Mexicana de Economı´a y Finanzas, Vol. 11, No. 2, (2016), pp. 39-49 47
is the portfolio of securities in the bottom third five-year average of annual returns computed
at t− 1. RMt is the annual returns of the daily weighted-average index of prices and quotes
from the Mexican Stock Exchange.
Rpt − Rft = αp + βp1 (RMt − Rft) + βp2MOM1t + βp3MOM5t + upt (1)
We used this formulation to test whether short-term cycle investment
strategies or long-term cycle investment strategies are captured as part of the
pricing mechanism in the Mexican Stock Exchange. The intercept represents
an estimation of the abnormal return. Under the null hypothesis the abnormal
returns are equal to zero. We tested the predictability of one- and five-years
lagged returns (momentum effect and long-term reverse effect). The estimates
of abnormal returns on the portfolios (α) along with estimated coefficients of
the market factor (βp1), the short term cycle investment strategies (βp2) and
the long-term cycle investment strategies (βp3), for the period 1998-2006 are
shown in Table 5. The coefficients of the market factor and MOM1t are
significantly different from zero for all three portfolios, whereas the coefficients
of MOM5 are not significant.
Table 5.Multifactorial model regression.
January 1994 to December 2006.
***Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent
MOM1t is the annual return of a self-financing strategy that takes a long position inMO1t
and a short position inMO3t . MO1t is the portfolio of securities in the top third of annual
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returns in year t − 1. MO3t is the portfolio of securities in the bottom third of annual
returns in year t-1. MOM5t is the annual return of a self-financing strategy that takes a
long position in MO1 5t and a short position in MO3 5t. MO1 5t is the portfolio of
securities in the top third five-year average of annual returns computed at t− 1. MO3 5t
is the portfolio of securities in the bottom third five-year average of annual returns computed
at t− 1. RMt is the annual return of the daily weighted average index of prices and quotes
from the Mexican Stock Exchange. Rft is the annual return of the 10-year US t-bills. α is
the intercept.
V. Concluding Remarks
We examined the influence on portfolio returns of both short-term cycle
investment strategies or long-term cycle investment strategies in the Mexican
Stock Exchange over a long time period, prior to the recent global crisis. The
returns of three portfolios are examined one year after the portfolio-formation
periods. Risk-adjusted returns are estimated as the intercepts from
a multifactor model regression. The portfolios show no abnormalities in the
returns, which is consistent with the efficient-market proposition. The
factor-mimicking portfolios seem to actually reflect short-term cycle investment
strategies, but not long-term investment cycle strategies. Therefore it is
expected than in Mexico the magnitude of short- term cycle investment
strategies profits is lower and less persistent than the effect found in previous
studies on developed markets. Complementarily, infrequent trading may
contribute as a potential measurement problem. The effect of short-term cycle
investment strategies upon Jegdeesh and Titman (1993) is a major challenge to
the efficient market hypothesis. In tests conducted in the United States results
have been both strong and persistent. The results for the 1993-2006 period
suggest that neither a momentum strategy nor a contrarian strategy would
yield significant returns in the Mexican Stock Exchange.
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